New Interview on China's Foreign Law Enforcement Assistance and US Responses

On 12 March, USIP’s Ena Dion and I were interviewed by USIP on China’s growing foreign law enforcement aid program and how the US should respond. The original interview can be found here: https://www.usip.org/publications/2025/03/how-china-uses-police-assistance-reshape-global-security

It is reprinted below:

What is foreign law enforcement assistance and why do states use it?

Dion: Foreign law enforcement assistance refers to one country’s support or aid to another country’s law enforcement agencies to assist them in combating crime, maintaining security and upholding justice. This assistance can take various forms. Some of the most common are training and capacity building for criminal justice actors, or transfers of technology and equipment to law enforcement bodies for investigations.

While this might seem like a one-way street, foreign law enforcement assistance is closely tied to broader security cooperation, wherein the law enforcement agencies of various countries work together to address transnational crime, terrorism and other security threats that transcend borders and are of common interest. This includes activities such as information and intelligence sharing, joint investigations and joint operations.

Why has China expanded its use of foreign law enforcement engagements?

Herbert: Since the early 2000s China has substantially increased the scope and geographic reach of its law enforcement assistance. Growth accelerated after the launch of the Global Security Initiative in April 2022, which lays out a framework for China to take on an expanded role and influence in international security. This is part of a broader movement toward increased external engagement. Growth in law enforcement assistance, however, has been less visible than parallel upticks in economic, military and diplomatic engagements.

This links to Beijing’s strategic-level goals, in which China has sought to develop a cadre of allies as a counterbalance to U.S. and Western power and to reshape the international security environment to their interests.

Dion: In September 2024, at a security forum attended by representatives from 122 countries, China’s Minister for Public Security Wang Xiaohong described China’s aims to train thousands of overseas law enforcement officers to “develop in a more fair, reasonable and efficient direction” for global security. While not wholly clear, China’s alternate vision for global security includes greater emphasis on preserving state or party strength and stability — and less focus on a strong civil society.

For policing, this includes a model that puts a significant focus on policing social order and relies heavily on surveillance technology. More operationally, China uses foreign law enforcement assistance to protect its interests abroad — such as investment projects, Chinese workers and diaspora populations — from terrorism, civil unrest or petty crime. This operational case is less discussed internationally but is very important for China domestically and has had a noticeable influence on where and how they provide assistance.  

Where does China’s law enforcement assistance currently stand?

Herbert: While increasing, Chinese law enforcement assistance is still relatively small in both the scale and breadth of packages offered. 

Starting with the scale — in 2023, China reportedly provided training to 2,700 foreign officers. Mostly, this involved two-to-three-week training opportunities in China offered to relatively small groups of officers. However, there appears to be movement toward increased field training. Nonetheless, there is a clear trend over time toward an increase in this training level, which Chinese officials have indicated will be sustained, with an aim to train 3,000 officers in 2025.

While this may sound large, it’s only a fraction of what some other major powers train in an average year.

And when it comes to equipment, there are examples where Chinese assistance has been consistent. Larger equipment packages are heavy on transfers of technology, particularly surveillance equipment. But more often, equipment aid is sporadic and small in scale — sometimes as small as constructing a single police post or providing a few motorcycles.

Dion: As for the breadth of assistance, many Chinese assistance efforts pursue targeted goals closely tied to Chinese interests. These include protecting Chinese economic interests or foreign investments, protecting or controlling the Chinese diaspora, and, many believe, gathering information through backdoors in security technologies.

This limited focus has been a point of frustration for some foreign law enforcement officers, who have stressed that there is frequently a divergence between China’s interests and their own core operational challenges and assistance needs — and that there was limited operational engagement with Chinese police after the assistance programs had been completed.

What concerns do China’s investments in foreign law enforcement assistance raise for the U.S. interests?

Dion: While still in the nascent stages, the uptick in Chinese investment in foreign law enforcement assistance has raised several concerns for U.S. observers.

First, there is a concern that law enforcement assistance will help China develop stronger relationships with strategically important countries, resulting in a coalition willing to back Chinese policies on the international stage. China hopes a strong coalition would allow them to reshape global norms and institutions, including those related to security. This is compounded by concern that safeguards on U.S. support — such as the Leahy Law, which disallows assistance to foreign security forces credibly accused of gross violations of human rights — give China, which has no similar restrictions, more ability to maneuver in such contexts.

Secondly, there is a fear that Chinese assistance will successfully export a model of policing that enables or encourages authoritarianism via trainings geared toward that approach, as well as via Chinese-provided technologies — both part of law enforcement assistance packages and transferred via other channels — that may enable politically motivated surveillance and unauthorized data collection, particularly of government opponents. Some also fear the prevalence of Chinese tech will lead to dependence on China for maintenance and repairs, thus undercutting U.S. technological cooperation.

Lastly, concerns about Chinese police assistance are closely tied to concerns about the growing network of Chinese “service centers.” These centers have been established by China’s regional public security bureaus (not police) in 53 countries globally, sometimes without the host country’s permission or knowledge. The Chinese Foreign Ministry claims they provide administrative services to Chinese citizens living overseas, like renewing drivers’ licenses and national ID cards. However, they’ve been implicated in monitoring, controlling and coercing Chinese dissidents abroad and spreading propaganda. Several countries — including the U.S., Canada and the U.K. — are investigating the centers, with the U.S. Department of Justice deeming them a threat to sovereignty.

How can the U.S. conceptualize a response to rising Chinese assistance?

Herbert: For the U.S., responding to the challenge posed by rising Chinese law enforcement assistance involves two elements: one regarding global engagement and the other a review and adaptation of our own approaches.

1. Use diplomatic and law enforcement engagement to underscore the risks associated with the Chinese approach to policing.

At a global level, the U.S. can avoid ostracizing recipients of Chinese law enforcement aid. Interviews have underscored there is a genuine demand, especially within security forces around the globe, for the type of training, equipment and operational support that the United States can provide.

Despite its efforts, China does not yet offer a credible alternative. And while there is also genuine international demand for Chinese assistance, particularly its technologic components, assessments of such support and the feasibility of the Chinese model abroad are decidedly mixed among its recipients. However, welcoming Chinese assistance does not necessarily imply a preference for Chinese style policing or politics. Rather, many security officials interviewed for our report described it as a pragmatic decision to fill gaps in capacity or equipment.

Notably, complaints about the utility of Chinese training and the performance of equipment are common. In turn, the instillation of extensive surveillance networks in a number of African cities, promoted by China as a key policing tool, have not been correlated with a substantial decline in crime rates — with crime in Nairobi actually increasing.

This creates an opportunity for the U.S. to buttress its influence with a wide swath of foreign countries through continued law enforcement support. It risks being counterproductive for the U.S. to simply cut off a country that accepts any support from China. A U.S. approach that focuses on the gaps in capacity that drive specific states to accept Chinese assistance would likely yield greater strategic benefit and undercut China’s long-term trajectory in this field.

Meanwhile, deeper U.S. study on the performance of Chinese law enforcement approaches in other states, coupled with active efforts to strategically disseminate those findings, could be a potentially powerful way to underscore the limited uses for Chinese law enforcement assistance.

2. The U.S. should review and adapt its own approach to providing foreign law enforcement support.

In responding to rising Chinese assistance, it’s important to also reflect on what the U.S. does right. Unlike China, the U.S. provides trainings around the world, mostly in host countries or at regional law enforcement academies. This localized approach maximizes the number of billets in training initiatives while minimizing extraneous costs, such as airline tickets and hotels.

U.S. programs also provide significant amounts of equipment and supplies that are readily used and are often important parts of long-term partnerships, including in strategically important countries such as Colombia, the Philippines and Kenya.

Finally, U.S. programs aim to strengthen effectiveness of whole systems, from investigations through prosecution and incarceration. The U.S. frequently aims to achieve systemic change — enhancing whole-of-sector capacity, building or reforming institutions. Underlying this approach is an understanding that it is more cost-effective for the United States to equip partner forces to address a security threat than to risk the need for direct U.S. intervention.

Building on this through a review and re-envisioning of the strategic goals of law enforcement assistance is an essential approach in responding to rising Chinese activity. A more efficient and cost-effective system focused on strategic objectives across different departments and bureaus can address threats to U.S. national security before their impacts are felt at home, reduce the need for direct U.S. intervention, and outcompete China’s security assistance model.

The United States can also make a substantial and much-needed difference on the provision of technology and technical skills — an area where China has already made extensive inroads.

Interviewed officers in multiple countries have stressed their concern about the data-integrity risks associated with Chinese-donated equipment. However, there are currently very few alternative options, particularly at a low price. A strategy to connect U.S. technology companies and foreign police officials can help undercut China’s growing dominance in this respect.

Finally, federal law enforcement staff operating abroad play a critical role, implementing trainings, offering investigative support and cultivating relationships with local law enforcement officers.

In interviews with foreign law enforcement officials in Africa, Latin America and Asia, a common thread was appreciation not only for the breadth and quality of U.S. programs, but also for the ways in which they lead to this tangible follow-up and operational coordination with U.S. law enforcement. 

These partnerships can sustain broader openness to U.S. security cooperation on areas of mutual interest in strategically critical regions around the world.

New article: Sudan, Chad and Libya knit together as illicit markets enable conflict economy

On 17 December, ENACT published an article I authored on Sudan’s conflict and illicit economies, with a focus on how cross-border smuggling from Libya and Chad is being impacted. The original article can be found here: https://enactafrica.org/enact-observer/sudan-chad-and-libya-knit-together-as-illicit-markets-enable-conflict-economy

It is reprinted below:

Sudan, Chad and Libya knit together as illicit markets enable conflict economy

Sudan’s civil war continues to rage, with no sign that either the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) or Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are close to a military victory or open to a ceasefire.

Over 10 million civilians are displaced within Sudan or into neighbouring countries. Its economy is in ruins, with business centres transformed into battlefields. Severe hunger afflicts half the population, with famine emerging in Darfur.

Less discussed, however, is the impact of the conflict on regional illicit markets. The war has had a catalytic effect on these, as civilians and combatants turn to smuggling networks for key goods. Illicit businesses have boomed, especially in the historically marginalised borderlands between Chad, Libya and Sudan.

Although many types of smuggled goods feed the conflict economy, food, fuel and arms stand out as especially important in and around Sudan’s northern and western borders.

Food smuggling into Sudan predates the war, but the conflict has supercharged it. In recent research conducted by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, interviewees flagged a marked increase in the clandestine movement of food (such as rice, pasta, flour, sugar and cooking oil) over the last eight months, as hunger in Sudan has worsened.

Interviewees report that food smuggling in Sudan’s borderlands is highly decentralised, with many relatively small smugglers plying the routes between southern Libya, northern Chad, and northwestern Sudan.

Like food, fuel smuggling on Sudan’s borders is not new. A high-volume trade in contraband petrol and diesel from eastern Libya to Sudan emerged the year before the war, reportedly controlled by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) and RSF. The conflict’s disruption of licit fuel supplies in Sudan has expanded the trade’s value and volume.

The main route remains through eastern Libya. On it, a few LAAF-linked actors smuggle fuel from coastal depots to the southern city of Kufra and across into SAF-controlled areas in Sudan. One research contact estimated that 500 000 barrels of petrol and diesel were smuggled weekly via this route.

Over the past year, another smuggling route has emerged between LAAF-controlled southwestern Libya, northern Chad, and Sudan’s western Darfur region. While initially ad hoc, driven by low-level smugglers, it has reportedly become more tightly organised and controlled by LAAF and RSF officials.

Weapons trafficking is perhaps the most militarily critical of the cross-border illicit markets boosted by the war. Most international reporting focuses on weapons trafficking to Sudan by nations supporting either the RSF or SAF. While this fuels the conflict, it is just one part of the picture.

A more decentralised arms trade has emerged, primarily concentrated around the Chad-Sudan border. This trade primarily draws on weapons and ammunition already in Libya or other regional conflict zones. However, in the tri-border region a recent seizure of four trailers of weapons imported through the Libyan port of Benghazi destined for Chad highlights the risk that international trafficking pathways could be emerging.

The weapons trade across the Chad-Sudan border is bidirectional, with Sudanese traffickers exporting weapons stolen from or abandoned by SAF personnel in Darfur to networks in eastern Chad, which then move them to other regional markets. This points to the evolution of important counter-cyclical markets in goods – mostly weapons, stolen vehicles, plundered consumer goods and hashish – smuggled out of Sudan.

The conflict has also driven an increase in human smuggling along Sudan’s borders. This is dominated by refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries, whose avenues for legal and safe movement out of the country have shrunk over the past 20 months. Human smuggling networks have either expanded existent operations or developed new routes along the Egyptian, Libyan and Chadian borders. The conflict is effectively reinvigorating and partially reshaping the human smuggling ecosystem in Sudan and neighbouring states.

Crucially, these illicit markets are not static and will probably continue evolving and expanding as the conflict continues. Experience from other regional conflicts, notably Libya, has also shown that shifts in illicit markets and war economies can have a lasting impact long after the guns have stopped firing.

For international actors working to end the war, together with understanding and monitoring the conflict’s intersection with illicit markets, is critical.

First, combatants increasingly rely on weapons and fuel trafficked in from abroad to continue the conflict, and smuggled food is critical for starving civilians. Understanding how these flows are evolving can warn international actors about emerging risks and help them tailor responses.

Second, the conflict has led to a growing intersection of illicit and state actors. While the war has caused the breakdown of the Sudanese state, interviewees said smuggling often occurred with the knowledge and protection of RSF- and SAF-affiliated actors in Sudan and officials in neighbouring states.

Officials financially vested in the conflict economy could be disinclined to make peace. Even if peace comes, such connections risk subverting the rule of law, eroding public institutions’ capacities and worsening citizens’ trust in the state. Once illicit and state actors are intertwined, connections can be difficult to reverse.

Third, this could impact the long-term evolution of illicit economies in Sudan. Even a relatively speedy end to the conflict would leave the country weaker, with a wrecked economy and overwhelmed law enforcement. Countering illicit economies probably wouldn’t be prioritised.

Lastly, there are regional consequences to consider. Empowered illicit markets and criminal networks connected to Sudan’s conflict could escalate corruption and weaken governmental capabilities in neighbouring countries. The trafficked arms flowing into the country now could well reverse in the future, fuelling regional instability and violence.

Going forward, most international focus on Sudan will likely be geared towards negotiating a ceasefire and building longer-term peace. However, given the above risks, the conflict economy and its tie-ins with regional markets should be given more attention.

At this point, there is particular value in three interlinked policy areas. First, enhanced efforts to track and analyse the evolution of the conflict economy, with an eye on how this could fuel instability or corruption in Sudan or neighbouring states. Ideally, this should be done in a shareable way and for maximum reach.

Second, policy activity to counter crime on the ground is critical, though it focuses on addressing the worst harms of the war economy, such as abusive human smuggling and unchecked weapons trafficking. Such a nuanced approach could also help mitigate the risk that crackdowns on cross-border smuggling of key commodities – such as food and fuel – unintentionally worsen vulnerable populations’ situations.

Targeted financial and travel sanctions on key members of the criminal ecosystems fuelling Sudan’s war economy could help deter political and business elites in the region from becoming more involved in such illicit economic flows.

For best effect multiple policy tools, possibly under a single, forward-looking strategy, could be used in tandem with prosecutorial approaches, law enforcement capacity building, and diplomatic pressure on regional states and non-state actors facilitating illicit flows. With this, development aid to communities harmed by the war and war economy is critical.

Responding to both ensuring a lasting ceasefire and the emergent illicit economies will be essential for sustained stability in Sudan and the region.

New Report on Troubled Political Transitions and Organized Crime

I’m delighted to launch my latest report: Troubled transitions and organised crime in Ethiopia and Tunisia.

Co-authored with Tadesse Simie Metekia, the report analyzes how troubled political transitions and democratic backsliding can impact organized crime. After laying out a theory, it delves into case studies from Ethiopia and Tunisia.

The report can be accessed here.