Trends in Organized Crime, Smuggling, and International Security.
I’m delighted to launch my latest report: Troubled transitions and organised crime in Ethiopia and Tunisia.
Co-authored with Tadesse Simie Metekia, the report analyzes how troubled political transitions and democratic backsliding can impact organized crime. After laying out a theory, it delves into case studies from Ethiopia and Tunisia.
The report can be accessed here.
Delighted to be included in a great ISPI monograph: ‘The Cost of “Non-Maghreb”: Unpacking the Political and Economic Costs of Disunion and Divisions.’
My chapter, titled ‘The “Non-Maghreb” and Transnational Clandestine Flows from the Sahel Region,’ focuses on clandestine flows connecting the Sahel and Maghreb. It traces current dynamics around the smuggling of commodities, drugs and arms, and the movement of migrants, terrorists and mercenaries.
The chapter next turns to the structural factors which impede efforts by Maghrebi and Sahelien states to address these flows, including the structure of illicit markets, limited intra-state coordination, the growth of uncontrolled territories, and poor state relations with border communities.
The chapter ends with a brief set of policy recommendations. It can be accessed here.
I'm delighted to announce the publication of my new report, 'Blessing And Curse: Petroleum profits, control and fragility in Libya.’ Written with Emad Badi for the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the report looks at how Libya’s petroleum wealth has had both a positive and negative impact on the country's fragility.
The benefits of oil are well known, with profits from petroleum sales providing citizens and the state with an economic buffer, offsetting the impacts of weak state capacity, chaotic politics and violence.
However, the central economic importance of petroleum products has also led to negative impacts on fragility. This is not due to one single dimension, but rather a confluence of separate, though often reinforcing, dynamics. Perceptions of unfair resource allocation have led communities in oil and gas producing areas and regions to disrupt production, in order to press for jobs and a more equitable sharing of profits. Conflict entrepreneurs have transformed the control of oil and gas infrastructure into an economic weapon. The official entity tasked with protecting infrastructure and ensuring production, the Petroleum Facilities Guard, is a key part of the problem, with field units repeatedly halting production and transport of oil and gas.
The report delves into these dynamics in greater depth and sketches out a synchronized strategy to address them, involving targeted economic development, security sector reform, and national dialogue on resource sharing.
The report ican be found here: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/libyen/19331.pdf
