Italy claims it’s found a solution to Europe’s migrant problem. Here’s why Italy’s wrong.

Co-Authored with Jalel Harchaoui. Originally published on the Washington Post Monkey Cage, Available Here.

The seas off western Libya have been quiet since late July. Before that, they swarmed with smugglers’ boats overfilled with migrants, mostly sub-Saharan Africans heading for Europe. From 23,000 migrants per month, the flow of arrivals has slowed to a trickle.

The migrants are accumulating on Libya’s coast and many are incarcerated in opaque circumstances. Their movement has been stymied by militias, who have turned on the northbound flow of migrants they once profited from. Deep in the southern desert, emergent militia groups evince the goal of closing the border with Niger and Chad to migrants moving north — attempting to patrol areas that none of Libya’s three rival governments ever secured.

Motivating the Libyan militias’ newfound zeal for blocking migrant movement is a new policy spearheaded by the Italian government and embraced by the European Union. The approach relies on payment to militias willing to act as migrant deterrent forces. Italian government representatives use intermediaries such as mayors and other local leaders to negotiate terms of the agreements with the armed groups. They also build local support in the targeted areas by distributing humanitarian aid.

There are two channels for compensating the militias. First, multiple reports detail direct cash gifts. Second, a more politically consequential flow of money moves via the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. The E.U. is a major donor to the GNA, and Rome is apparently in a position to earmark some funds for entities that it wishes to reward. This official process allows Rome to claim it doesn’t remunerate the militias directly and the GNA to maintain that it stopped the flow of migrants.

Migration has emerged as one of the most politically charged issues in Europe in recent years. Since 2014, 1.7 million irregular migrants have arrived on the continent. In this context, the E.U. has sought to offshore migration enforcement, incentivizing its neighbors to halt the migrant flow by offering economic aid and political concessions.

To this end, in 2016, the E.U. struck a deal with Turkey, which significantly cut the flow of departing migrants. The E.U.’s attention then turned to Libya, with a view to duplicating the Turkish bargain. However, efforts to shut the migrant corridor — now the primary one into the E.U. — were impeded by Libya’s fractured political and security landscape. As it became clear that the vast majority of migrants now arrived, and stayed, in Italy, the E.U. rallied behind Italy’s approach.

While a narrow tactical success, the E.U.’s policy pushes the goal of a stable, united Libya farther out of reach for three principal reasons.

The policy empowers nonstate armed groups

The pay-them-to-stop scheme has introduced a novel way for amoral, uncontrolled armed groups to carry on extracting rents from the still-raging migrant crisis. Previously, migrants and smugglers paid militias a tax to depart for Europe. Now, the E.U. — coordinated by Italy — in effect pays a tax to the same groups to keep the migrants in place.

The payments also offer militias an imprimatur of legitimacy. That makes it easier for local power brokers to build political capital while continuing to profit handsomely. And if the funds stop, the armed formations can resume and tax migrant smuggling at any point.

Libya’s interior minister says that this policy assists in a “reconversion” of Libya’s militias into legitimate economic pursuits. This is fanciful. Militias leaders, and fighters beneath them, have the leeway to engage in other facets of Libya’s war economy — including smuggling of subsidized fuel and other commodities.

In 2015, an Italian oil company hired militias in western Libya to protect hydrocarbon installations. The militias gladly accepted the protection mission even as they continued profiting from human smuggling. This underscores that purchasing services from militias does not “reconvert” or reform them. The additional revenue only empowers them.

The policy stunts efforts to build a credible security apparatus in the near term

As a result of the arrangement promoted by Italy, Libya’s militias are now considered part of the GNA’s official security forces. This is a textbook case of hybrid security: A weak government claims that it has co-opted independent militias by offering them money. Armed groups in such situations continue pursuing their agenda and shun political compromise.

Libya is already deeply challenged by a hybrid security sector. Eighty percent of the country’s border guards derive from militia units. The guards’ continued militia ties and involvement in illicit activity hobble the effectiveness of the force. In interviews, Libyan security officials stress that one of their biggest concerns is how to handle and professionalize these hybrid forces so that they become genuinely integrated. By rewarding militias without scattering or reshuffling them, the Italian approach delays that integration process.

Italy’s strategy may breed conflict

The numerous armed actors not yet included in these deals are unlikely to watch passively as their enemies benefit. Some will seek to seize territory made more valuable by the new situation. Others may improvise alternative migration routes. In still other cases, militias will fragment, as fighters repudiate the commitments made by their leaders. Violent clashes in the city of Sabratha in mid-September are an illustration of this.

Moreover, factions aligned with Libyan National Army leader Khalifa Hifter, opponents of the GNA, will be tempted to intervene militarily to stop their rival from deriving political legitimacy from E.U.’s migrant strategy. An array of violent ripple effects across western Libya and beyond are thus to be expected.

For the moment, migration flows from Libya are down. However, migration routes were always just a symptom of state fragility. That fragility — and the vast challenges that remain to security and state consolidation — is the real crisis in Libya. The E.U.’s policy, instead of ameliorating the latter, sacrifices institutional strengthening in the pursuit of expediency.

By concentrating power into the hands of unaccountable actors, it undercuts the development of statutory security forces. Put bluntly, it weakens an already-weak state. Any approach that preferences short-term gains against migration while undercutting efforts to stabilize Libya is one with long-term strategic risks.

Algeria & Contraband: June Brief

This brief highlights contraband seizures reported in June by Algeria's Ministry of Defense.

Narcotics

Algeria seized slightly over 4,690 kilograms of kif (cannabis resin) in June. Fifty-six percent of seizures (2,665.45 kg) occurred along the north-western border with Morocco, primarily in the wilaya of Tlemcen. Most seizures in this zone were medium sized (100-300 kg). In contrast, 26% of the month's seizure volume came from one extremely large interdiction in Béni‐Ounif, in the central-western wilaya of Béchar. Only 14% of the month's kif seizures took place away from the Moroccan border zone--most of these occurred in the eastern wilayas of Ghardaïa and Biskra, underscoring the continued salience of non-coastal drug smuggling routes from Morocco to Libya.

A small number of psychotropic pills (1,780) were also seized in Biskra in June, though by far the largest seizure of psychotropics (30,100 pills) occurred near the central southern city of In Salah on 09 June.

Weapons

No significant weapons or ammunition seizures were made in June.

Migrants

Compared to 2016, Algerian clandestine migration to Europe in 2017 has spiked sharply. Between January and June 2016, Algerian authorities reported the interdiction of 388 Algerian clandestine migrants on and close to the country's littoral. Over the same period in 2017, 1,317 Algerian migrants were interdicted, including 440 in June alone. In 70% of cases, June's reporting data was not specific enough to analyze where the migrants were departing from. In the minority of cases where the data was clear it showed that 52% of migrants were caught in the west, departing for Spain, 14% were caught in the country's center, likely departing for Spain, and 32% were caught in the east, departing for Italy, mainly Sardinia.

In addition to Algerian migrants, the Army and Gendarmerie detained 381 non-Algerian migrants. This number is elevated slightly from June 2016, when 226 migrants were arrested. In total, 3,941 non-Algerian migrants have been detained to date in 2017, versus 3,576 in 2016.

Subsidized Commodities

Petrol

Between 01 and 30 June, the Algerian Army, Gendarmerie, and Customs seized 74,096 liters of contraband petrol. Fifty percent of interdictions, 37,066 liters, occurred in the Wilayas of Souk‐ Ahras, Tébessa, and El‐Taref on the Tunisian border. Algeria's southern border zone abutting Mali and Niger accounted for another sixteen percent of seizures (12,520 liters). Finally, the border with Morocco, once the epicenter of the contraband trade in petrol, accounted for only two seizures in June, totaling 7,680 liters. Information on the origin of twenty-two percent of June petrol seizures was unclear or involved mixed reporting.

Tobacco

Three seizures of contraband tobacco were made in June. Two occurred in Tlemcen, on the Moroccan border, involving 9,500 cigarettes and 13,600 units of tobacco. The final interdiction occurred in the east, involving Algerian forces from Biskra and El Oued. Likely intended for the Libyan market, the shipment involved 10,560 kg of tobacco.

Food

In June, 92.5% of contraband food seizures were made along Algeria's southern borders with Mali and Niger. In all a total of 84,100 kg of contraband food was interdicted, along with 30,900 liters of olive oil and 2,308 beverages. While olive oil smuggling was concentrated along the southern border, seizures of contraband beverages were exclusively made on the Moroccan frontier.

Other

A number of additional types of goods were seized in Algeria during June. Gold mining tools and implements were the most common, including jackhammers, electric generators, and metal detectors. Most of these seizures occurred on or close to Algeria's border with Niger, where a significant artisanal gold rush is ongoing. In addition, a 3,096 bottles of contraband cosmetics were uncovered in El Oued, an entrepôt for both Libya and Tunisia bound smuggling. Finally, in the north-east, in El-Taref, over nine kilograms of illegal coral was interdicted.

At the edge: Trends and routes of North African clandestine migrants

From The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. The Publication Can be Accessed Here.

Jointly with the Institute for Security Studies, the Global Initiative published At the edge (Nov 2016) as part of a research project on human smuggling from Africa to Europe, funded by the Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF). Our research team sat down with smugglers themselves in Libya, Turkey, in the Sahel and in Sub-Saharan Africa to understand who are the smugglers behind Europe’s migration crisis, to understand how they operate, what drew them into the trade, and how they are responding to international community efforts to end illicit migration.

In 2015, over 16,000 Algerians, Tunisians and Moroccans were caught while attempting to migrate to Europe covertly. Though North Africans are a relatively small portion of the masses of clandestine migrants, they are a critical group to understand. They are the innovators and early adaptors of new methods and routes for migrant smuggling, such as their pioneering in the 1990s and 2000s of the routes across the Mediterranean that now fuel Europe’s migration crisis. Understanding how and why North Africans migrate, the routes they use, and how these are changing, offers insights into how clandestine migration methods and routes in general may shift in the coming years. In shaping better responses to actual dynamics, it is important for countries to proactively address the chronic conditions that drive forced migration before they generate social instability.

How does your garden grow? The Tuxtla Gutiérrez Cocaine Experiment

Originally Published by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Available Here.

The find was unexpected and troubling. On September 9th, in the small Mexican town of Tuxtla Gutiérrez—located in Chiapas state—authorities uncovered the first evidence of large-scale efforts to grow coca in the country. Acting on the tip, members of the Mexican security services raided a property and found over 1,600 coca plants. The plantation was reportedly closely connected to a series of arrests in the nearby city of Tapachula, which involved the seizure of 180 kilos of coca leaf—the organic precursor for cocaine. The plantation in Tuxtla Gutiérrez is reportedly Mexico’s first evidence of coca growing in the country, and presents key questions: why in Mexico, why now, and where is this likely to lead?

The modern cocaine business is rooted in coca growth in South America—primarily in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Once grown, coca is transformed—step-by-step—into cocaine. Several hundred tons of dried coca leaves are required for the production of a single ton of cocaine, requiring mass cultivation—and thus a large production area—to cater to the cocaine consumer markets in North America, Europe, and increasingly East Asia. In the modern era of cocaine, this cultivation has occurred almost exclusively in the South American nations listed above. However, this monopoly on production is rooted in social, political, and (illicit) economic rational, not horticultural necessities.

In the early 20th century the Dutch and Japanese developed thriving coca plantations in East Asia, while the British and French experimented with its growth in their African colonies and in other areas around the world. World War II and the gradual prohibition of cocaine that followed curtailed coca’s industrial-scale production in these disparate areas of the world. Only in South America—where the shrub was first domesticated and still home to a thriving indigenous market in coca (though not cocaine)—did growing continue. Efforts by South American states to eradicate production have had little success, and have more often than not resulted in alienated farmers and empowered insurgents. Until now, drug trafficking organizations have had little impetus to relocate production outside of the Andean region.

While only its creators know the rational for developing the plantation in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, an examination of the current situation in Central American transport countries and the Caribbean provide hints. First, violence and instability in Central America has worsened over the last several years. Drug trafficking organizations are popularly viewed as thriving in—and actively seeking to create—chaotic situations and failing states, however this is only true to a degree. For both licit and illicit businesses, societal chaos and the absence of state services impede financial and logistical planning, and generally increase the cost of doing business. While illicit businesses may have tools—such as paramilitary protection units—that enable them to weather chaotic situations better than most, such situations are far from ideal for them. In Central America street gangs, tumbadores (groups specializing in the theft of narcotic shipments), and local drug trafficking groups have gained power in recent years, increasing the risks—and hence the cost—that Mexican DTOs face in transporting narcotics through the area.

Apart from Central America, the other main route between South American cocaine production zones and North American markets is through the Caribbean—a route that was heavily favored in the 1970s and 1980s, before being largely abandoned due to aggressive U.S. maritime and air interdiction efforts. There have been some attempts to reinvigorate trafficking through this area, though U.S. military and law enforcement focus on the area make smuggling efforts complicated and risky. There are few easy—and economical—transport options for Mexican cocaine traffickers in the present day. Attempts to grow the drug in Mexico may thus be an experiment in shortening their supply chain, decreasing their exposure to chaos in Central America and U.S. interdiction efforts in the Caribbean. An additional benefit for Mexican cartels is that domestic production of coca cuts Colombian DTOs out of the equation, and increasing their own profits.

As an experiment, the Tuxtla Gutiérrez plantation may have succeeded even though it was uncovered. Over 1,600 plants were grown, existing long enough for at least 180 kilograms of coca leaf to be harvested. The problem with the Tuxtla Gutiérrez plantation was, mainly, that the effort took place in Tuxtla Gutiérez. While Mexico’s security services have been buffeted by the drug trafficking wars of the 2000s, they are far better trained, well equipped, and more numerous than their counterparts in Central America. Had the Tuxtla Gutiérrez plantation been created on the other side of the Mexico-Guatemala border—a few kilometers from the town—it is far less likely the endeavor would have been uncovered. This raises the question of whether other coca production experiments are occurring in Guatemala or other Central American countries? If so, already weakened Central American countries could face a significant new and extremely dangerous threat.

The Tuxtla Gutiérrez plantation also raises risks outside of Mexico and Central America. The increasing popularity of cocaine in Europe and East Asia have forced DTOs to develop long cocaine supply chains that stretch through often unstable areas of the world and are highly vulnerable to disruption and interdiction. If drug trafficking organizations are experimenting in growing coca closer to one consumption market, it raises the possibility they similarly may try to create plantations closer to their other major markets. As the coca producers of the early 20th century demonstrated, there is little horticultural bar to developing coca production in Asia and Africa. It remains to be seen whether the Tuxtla Gutiérrez experiment is the beginning of a new trend, and if so where it will focus and what the ramifications will be.